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INTRODUCTION
Mathematicians are one over on the physicists in that they already have
a unified theory of mathematics, namely set theory. Unfortunately the
plethora of independence results since the invention of forcing has taken
away some of the luster of set theory in the eyes of many mathematicians.
Will man’s knowledge of mathematical truth be forever limited to those the-
orems derivable from the standard axioms of set theory, ZFC? This author
does not think so, he feels that set theorists intuition about the universe is
stronger than ZFC. Here in this paper, using part of this intuition, he intro-
duces some axiom schemata which he feels are very natural candidates for
being considered as part of the axioms of set theory. These schemata assert
the existence of many generics over simple inner models. The main purpose
of this article is to present arguments for why the assertion of the existence
of such generics belongs to the axioms of set theory.
Our central guiding principle in justifying the axioms is what Maddy
called the rule of thumb maximize in her survey article on the axioms of set
theory, [BAI] and [BAII]. More specifically, our intuition conforms with that
expressed by Mathias in his article “What is Maclane Missing?” challenging
Mac Lane’s view of set theory.
∗Would like to thank Ehud Hrushovski for supporting him with funds from NSF Grant
DMS 8959511
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This might be a good moment to challenge one of Mac Lane’s
opinions, which I believe to rest on a misconception. On page
359 of his book he writes, after reflecting on the plethora of
independence results, that “for these reasons ’set’ turns out to
have many meanings, so that the purported foundations of all
Mathematics upon set theory totters.” Elsewhere, on page 385,
he remarks that “the Platonic notion that there is somewhere the
ideal realm of sets, not yet fully described, is a glorious illusion.”
I would suggest a contrary view: independence results within
set theory are generally achieved either by examining an inner
model of the universe (an inner model being a transitive class
containing all ordinals) or by utilizing forcing to obtain a larger
universe of which the original one is an inner model. The con-
ception that begins to seem more and more reasonable with the
advance of the inner model program on the one hand and a
deeper understanding of iterated forcing on the other is that
within one enormous universe there are many inner models, and
the various “independence arguments” may be reworked to give
positive information about the way various inner models relate
to one another. Far from undermining the set theoretic point of
view, the various techniques available for building models actu-
ally promote that unity.
One of this author’s reasons for having an intuition about sets similar
to that expressed by Mathias is given by a very short look back at the
history of the development of mathematics. Mathematics began with the
study of mathematical objects very physical and concrete in nature and has
progressed to the study of things completely imaginary and abstract. Most
mathematicians now accept these objects as mathematically legitimate as
any of their more concrete counterparts. It is enough that these objects
are consistently imaginable, i.e., exist in the world of set theory. Applying
the same intuition to set theory itself, we get some motivation for why we
should accept as sets generic objects over inner models.
Using the rule of thumb maximize, the principle of reflection and esthet-
ics as a basis we will now procede to give further more concrete arguments
which say that theories T extending ZFC implying the existence of many
generics over inner models reflect truth about the universe of sets V. While
the arguments are not technically sophisticated, the author hopes this will
not detract from the axioms intuitive appeal.
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SET THEORETIC PRELIMINARIES
In order to make this article accessible to the general reader, we review
in this section some of the set theoretic basics needed to understand the
arguments in favor of the schemata. As this review is sparse, any gaps
in the readers understanding can be filled in with reading the appropriate
sections of [Jech2] or [Kunen]. Set theorists can safely skip this section
except for the last three definitions, which are not standard.
A formula in the language of set theory is a formula in the first order
predicate claculus built from atomic formulas of the form x = y and x ∈ y.
We denote the universe of sets by V and the satisfaction relation by |= .
A class is a collection of sets satisfying some formula of set theory. (So all
sets are classes.) We denote the class of ordinals by Ord. A set Y ⊆ X is
a definable subset of X if for some formula of set theory ϕ(x),
∀y(y ∈ Y ↔ X |= ϕ(y) )
If X is a set, then Def(X) is the set of all definable subsets of X and
P (X) the set of all subsets of X. If we assume the axiom of foundation
then the universe of sets V can be written as
V =
⋃
α∈Ord
Vα
where Vα+1 = Vα ∪ P (Vα) and if α is a limit ordinal then
Vα =
⋃
β<α
Vβ
By a real we will usually mean a subset of ω, but within set theory a real
can also mean an element of Vω+1, ω
ω or R. The constructible universe
L (the class of constructible sets) can be written as
L =
⋃
α∈Ord
Lα
where L∅ = ∅, Lα+1 = Lα ∪ Def(Lα) and if α is a limit ordinal then
Lα =
⋃
β<α
Lβ. L is a model of ZFC + GCH. L is absolute in the sense
that if M and N are transitive models of ZF with the same ordinals, then
LM = LN , i.e., the class of things M thinks is constructible is the class of
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things which N thinks is constructible. Similarly, if X is a transitive set,
L(X) the class of sets constructible from X, can be written as
L(X) =
⋃
α∈Ord
L(X)α
where L(X)∅ = X, L(X)α+1 = L(X)α ∪Def(L(X)α) and if α is a limit
ordinal, then L(X)α =
⋃
β<α
L(X)β . In general L(X) is a model of ZF but
not of AC. If M is a transitive model and x ∈M, we say x is definable
in M if for some formula ϕ(v) of set theory, M |= ∃!vϕ(v) ∧ ϕ(x). Now
we turn to a short review of forcing. If P is a partial order, a subset D
of P is said to be dense if for every p ∈ P, there is a d ∈ D such that
d ≤ p. If p, q ∈ P such that there is no r ∈ P such that r ≤ p and r ≤ q,
then we say p and q are incompatible, written, p ⊥ q. If P is a partial
order in a transitive model M of ZFC, then a subset G of M is said
to be M generic if G intersects every dense subset of P in M. If M is
a transitive model of ZFC and P is a partial order in M such that for
every p ∈ P there is r and q in P such that r ≤ p, q ≤ p, r ⊥ q, and
if G is an M generic subset of P, then there is a transitive model M [G]
of ZFC such that
1. G ∈M [G] and G 6∈M
2. OrdM = OrdM [G]
3. If N is a transitive model such that M ⊆ N, OrdM = OrdN , and
G ∈ N, then M [G] ⊆ N.
M [G] is called a forcing extension of M. A partial order P is separative
if for every p, q ∈ P, p 6≤ q → ∃r(r ≤ p ∧ r ⊥ q). Without loss
of generality we can assume all the partial orders we use are separative.
Associated with every separative partial order is the set of regular open
subsets of P, denoted r.o.(P ).
r.o.(P ) =
{
S ⊂ P | ∀p, q ∈ P p ∈ S ∧ q ≤ p → q ∈ S ∧
∀p ∈ P (∀r ∈ P (r ≤ p → ∃q ∈ S(q ≤ r) ) → p ∈ S)
}
With the appropriate interpretation of + and • , r.o.(P ) is a complete
Boolean algebra. If κ and λ are cardinals, a Boolean algebra B is (κ, λ)
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distributive iff every collection of κ partitions of B of size at most λ has
a common refinement.
Theorem 1. If M is a transitive model of ZFC, κ is a cardinal in M
and M [G] is a forcing extension of M via the partial order P, then M [G]
has no functions f : κ→ κ not in the ground model if and only if r.o.(P )
is (κ, κ) distributive.
proof See [Jech2].
Definition 1. A subset r of ω is said to be absolutely definable if for
some Π1 formula θ(x),
1. V |= θ(r)
2. V ⊢ ∃!xθ(x)
A canonical example of an absolutely definable real is 0#.
Definition 2. x ∈ V is said to be weakly absolutely definable if for some
Σ1 formula ψ(x)
V |= ∀y(y ∈ x ↔ ψ(y) )
Definition 3. x ∈ V is said to be weakly absolutely definable of the form
Vα if for some ordinal α definable in L,
V |= ∀y(y ∈ x ↔ ρ(y) ≤ α)
THE SCHEMATA
In this section we list the Schemata. Schemata we know how to prove
the consistency of assuming the existence of a countable transitive model
of ZFC we label with a (*). The consistency of the other schemata are
just conjectured, and we write (Conj) besides those. Schemata which follow
from large cardinal assumptions we write (FLC) besides. Note that the
definitions are informal as the formal versions are unwieldy.
Definition 4. (*) (FLC) IFS(L) is the axiom schema which says for every
formula φ(x), if L |= there is a unique partial order P such that φ(P ),
then there is a L generic subset of P in the universe V.
Definition 5. (*) (FLC) IFS(L[r]) is the axiom schema of set theory
which says if r is an absolutely definable real then every partial order P
definable in L[r] has an L[r] generic subset.
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Definition 6. (*) IFS(L(R) is the axiom schema of set theory which says
if P is a partial order definable in L(R) such that
 R = RV
P
(By  we mean  in V) then there exists a L(R) generic subset G of
P.
Definition 7. (*) IFS(L(Vα)) is the axiom schema which says if Vα is
weakly absolutely definable of the form Vα and P is a partially ordered
set definable in L(Vα) such that
 Vα = V
V P
α
then there is a L(Vα) generic subset G of P.
Definition 8. (Conj) IFS(∀L(Vα)) is the axiom schema which says for
all α ∈ Ord, if P is a partially orderd set definable in L(Vα) such that
 Vα = V
V P
α
then there is a L(Vα) generic subset G of P.
Definition 9. (*) IFS−(∀L(Vα)) is the axiom schema which says for each
ordinal α if P is a partial order definable in L(Vω+α) such that P is ℵβ
closed for each β < α, then there is a L(Vω+α) generic subset G of P.
Definition 10. (Conj) IFS is the axiom schema of set theory which
says for every weakly absolutely definable set X, for every partial order P
definable in L(X), if
 XV
P
= X
then there exists an L(X) generic subset G of P.
Definition 11. (FLC + CH) IFS ↾ X ⊆ R makes the same claim as IFS
but only for X ⊆ R.
Definition 12. (*) CIFS is the axiom schema of set theory which says
that for each regular cardinal ℵα all definable subsets of L(Vω+α) are of
size at most ℵα.
We conjecture that IFS(∀L(Vα)) is consistent, since it is a natural gen-
eralization of IFS(L(Vα)). The intuition behind the conjecture that IFS
is consistent is somewhat more nebulous. One can look upon IFS(L(Vα))
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as saying the universe has a sort of minimal largeness with respect to the
L(Vα) because it implies there are many L(Vα) generics in the universe.
The L(Vα) provide a reference frame from which to measure the size of
the universe, since L(Vα) is absolute for any class model of ZFC contain-
ing Vα and L(Vα) generic subsets for partial orders definable in L(Vα)
maintain their genericity under extensions as long as Vα (and the class of
ordinals) is not changed. If X is weakly absolutely definable, L(X) is
also absolute for any class model of ZFC containing X. So IFS is a
natural generalization of IFS(L(Vα)) implying the universe has a minimal
largeness with respect to each of the L(X). For a given weakly absolutely
definable set X the consistency of IFS ↾ X is easy to show.
WHY SHOULD THE SCHEMATA SHOULD HOLD IN V ?
Our version of the ’rule of thumb maximize’ will take the form of the
following three principles:
1. V |= ZFC
2. V is large with respect to Ord
3. V is large with respect to each of the Vα
In order to get a better handle on what principles two and three mean,
we shall use countable transitive sets as models for transitive classes scaled
down to a countable size. We will take a look at countable transitive mod-
els of ZFC satisfying principles two and three and look for common and
esthetically pleasing properties among them, i.e., properties that we think
V itself should satisfy. In order to see what principle two gives us, we fix
the height of the models under consideration i.e., we assume all our models
have the same set of ordinals α. (And we also assume of course that count-
able transitive models of ZFC with ordinals α exist.) So we are using α
as a model for Ord. Now there is a unique countable transitive model of
ZFC + V = L with height α, namely the set Lα. Lα ⊆M for every M
which is a countable transitive model of ZFC of height α and LM = Lα.
So the statement V = L expresses a kind of minimal property, the oppo-
site of what we are looking for. On the other hand, the statement IFS(L)
is a kind of minimal maximality condition among the countable transitive
models of ZFC with given height. Why? Suppose M,N are countable
transitive models of ZFC such that M |= IFS(L) with M ⊆ N and
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OrdN = OrdM . Then N |= IFS(L) since the interpretation of L and
of the L generics for the various partial orders definable in L are ab-
solute. Furthermore, larger models tend toward IFS(L), i.e., given any
countable transitive model M of ZFC and any finite list P1, . . . , Pn de-
finable in LM , if we let N be the forcing extension of M by the partial
order P1 × . . . × Pn then N has the same height as M and satisfies
IFS(L ↾ {P1, . . . , Pn}). So IFS(L) is a natural closure condition on the
countable transitive models of ZFC of given height. The arguments for the
axiom schema IFS(L[r]) have similar justifications. As we consider that
the relationships among countable transitive models of ZFC are reflections
of the relationships among transitive class models of ZFC, we argue that
IFS(L) and IFS(L[r]) should hold in V. If V 6|= IFS(L), it would be
as if the universe had an artificial boundary. It seems it would be an arti-
ficial constraint on V if for some P a partial order definable in L there
is no L generic. Note that under ZFC + IFS(L[r]), all the generics
asserted to exist by the axioms of IFS(L[r]) are in L(R) = L(Vω+1), so
IFS(L[r]) is really a schema about the structure of L(R). Note also that
to be more formal and to work strictly within ZFC we could have made
our arguments using countable transitive models of arbitrarily large finite
parts of ZFC and the schemata.
Why do we work with partial orders P definable in L and not all
P ∈ L? In the first place axioms asserting the existence of generics for
all P ∈ L are inconsistent with ZFC, but the main point is that we are
interested not in countable transitive models but in proper class models of
ZFC and forcing only gives the relative consistency of extensions of L of
the form L[G] only for those G ⊆ P where P is a partial order definable
(without parameters) in L. In keeping with our principal of maximality we
reinterpret this to mean that such generic extensions of L actually exist.
To investigate the consequences of principle three, we fix both the height
and the width at stage ω + 1 (i.e., Vω+1 ) among the models (which we
can assume satisfy ZFC + IFS(L[r]) ) under consideration. (All transitive
models of ZFC have the same first ω stages in the cumulative heirarchy.)
So we are using some countable ordinal as a model for Ord and some
countable set of reals as a model for the reals. Arguing as before we see that
IFS(L(R)) is a natural closure condition on this class of models, implying a
minimal kind of maximality. Similarly, we argue that among the countable
transitive models of given height and set of reals satisfying ZFC+IFS(L[r])
a natural closure property is that all sets definable in L(R) are of size at
most ℵ1 since the canonical forcing which collapse definable elements of
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L(R) to size ℵ1 are ω closed and therefore do not add reals. Continuing to
make use of our third principle, similar reasoning works for all the definable
stages Vα so we are lead to IFS(L(Vα)), IFS
−(∀L(Vα)), IFS(∀L(Vα)),
and CIFS.
Another justification for the schemata (see [BA I] page 492-493) is that
they are a way of making the power set thick. More precisely, insteads of
making P (Vα)−Vα large, they make L(Vα+1)−L(Vα) large, a slight variant
of the notion that the power set operation should be large. This is one of
the appeals behind IFS(∀L(Vα)), IFS
−(∀L(Vα)) and CIFS. Even under
IFS−(∀L(Vα)), for all regular cardinals ℵα, L(Vω+α+1)− L(Vω+α) 6= ∅.
CONNECTIONS WITH LARGE CARDINALS
It is not hard to see that 0# exists implies IFS(L) since as we show
later that IFS(L) is equivalent to the assumption that every set definable
in L is countable. So IFS(L) is a kind of intrinsic support for the large
cardinal axiom 0# exists. Similarily the picture of the universe given by
IFS(L[r]) is related to that under the assumption of a measurable cardinal.
If a measurable cardinal exists than r# exists for every r ⊆ ω, so that
means for every r ⊆ ω, every set definable in L[r] is countable. As we
shall soon prove, IFS(L[r]) holds if and only if for every r which is an
absolutely definable real, every set definable in L[r] is countable. So again
IFS(L[r]) provides a kind of intrinsic support for large cardinal axioms, in
that they give at some level similar pictures of the universe, even though
the consistency strength of the large cardinal axioms are much greater than
that of IFS(L) or IFS(L[r]). The most important connection between
large cardinals and the schemata known to the author is the fact which
was pointed out to him by Woodin that under large cardinal hypotheses,
IFS(↾ X ⊆ R) is equivalent to CH.
CONSISTENCY FROM A COUNTABLE TRANSITIVE
MODEL OF ZFC
Theorem 2. Let 〈θi | i < n〉 and {ϕij(x) | i < n, j < m, } be finite sets
of formulas with the θi being Π1. Let M be a countable transitive model
of ZFC. Then there exists a countable transitive model M ′ of M with
the same ordinals as M such that for each i < n,
M ′ |= ∃!rθi(r) ∧ θi(ri) →
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∧
j<m
(
(L[ri] |= ∃!P (ϕij(P )) ∧ ϕij(Pi) ) → ∃G ⊆ Pij(G is L[ri] generic)
)
proof Let α∗ ∈M such that
M |= α∗ > sup
{
|Dij | | ∃!xθi(x) ∧ θ(ri) ∧ ri ⊆ ω ∧
L[ri] |= ∃!P (ϕij(P ) ∧ ϕij(Pij) ∧ Dij is the set of dense subsets of Pij)
}
Let P be the set of finite partial one to one functions from α∗ to ω. Let
M ′ = M [G] where G is a M generic subset of P. Note that by the
Levy-Shoenfield absoluteness lemma, if M |= θi(ri) then also M
′ |= θi(ri).
Since all the Dij are countable in M
′ the Pij have L[ri] generic subsets
in M ′. To finish the proof it is enough to prove the following claim.
Claim: If a formula ψ(x) defines a real in M [G] then it is in M.
proof Suppose r is the unique real satisfying ψ(x) in M [G]. Since P
is separative, if p ∈ P and pi is an automorphism of P, then by [Jech 2]
lemma 19.10, for every formula ϕ(v1, . . . , vn) and names x1, . . . , xn
∗ p  ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) iff pip  ϕ(pix1, . . . , pixn)
Let ϕ(x) = ∃Y (ψ(Y ) ∧ x ∈ Y ). Let n ∈ ω. We will show that ||ϕ(nˇ)|| = 0
or ||ϕ(nˇ)|| = 1. If for no p ∈ P does p  ||ϕ(nˇ)|| then ||ϕ(nˇ)|| = 0. So let
p ∈ P such that p  ||ϕ(nˇ)||. By ∗ if pi is an automorphism of P then
pip  ||ϕ(nˇ)||. Let pi be a permutation of ω. pi induces an automorphism
of P by letting for p ∈ P, dompip = domp and letting pip(α) = pi(p(α)).
By letting pi vary over the permutations of ω it follows that ||ϕ(nˇ)|| = 1.
Let r˙ be the name with domain {nˇ | n < ω} and such that
r˙(nˇ) = ||ϕ(nˇ)||
iG(r˙) = r, but then r = {n | ||ϕ(nˇ)|| = 1} which means it is in M.
Corollary 3. If there is a countable transitive model of ZFC then
Con(ZFC + IFS(L[r]) )
Corollary 4. ZFC + IFS(L[r]) + ’there are no absolutely definable non-
constructible reals’ is consistent. (Relative to the assumption of a countable
transitive model of ZFC )
10
Theorem 5. If there is a countable transitive model of ZFC then
Con(ZFC + IFS(L(Vα)) )
proof Let 〈θi | i < n〉 and {ϕij(x) | i < n, j < m, } be finite sets of
formulas. Let M be a countable transitive model of ZFC. Without loss
of generality we can assume there exists ordinals α0, . . . αn−1 such that
LM |= ∃!αθi(α) ∧ θi(αi)
and αj < αk for j < k. It is enough to find a forcing extension N of M
such that for each i < n and j < m for some partial order Pij ∈ N N |=
L(Vαi) |= ∃!xψij(x) ∧ L(Vαi) |= ψij(Pij)
∧  Vαi = V
Pij
αi
→ ∃G(G is a L(Vαi) generic subset of Pij)
We define by induction on the lexicographical order of n × m sets Gij .
Suppose Pij is a partial order definable in L(Vαi)
M [{Gh,l|h≤i,l<j}] by ϕij(x)
and there exists a M [{Gh,l|h ≤ i, l < j}] generic subset of Pij not increas-
ing
V
M [{Gh,l|h≤i,l<j}]
αi
Then let Gij be such a M [{Gh,l|h ≤ i, l < j}] generic subset of Pij . (If
not, let Gij = ∅. ) Let
N =M [{Gij |i < n, j < m}]
Theorem 6. If there is a countable transitive model of ZFC, then
Con(ZFC + IFS(L(Vα)) + IFS(L[r]) )
proof Similar, just start with a model of enough of IFS(L[r]).
Theorem 7. If there is a countable transitive model of ZFC then
Con(ZFC + IFS−(∀L(Vα)) ) ∧ Con(ZFC + CIFS)
proof See the companion paper.
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SOME CONSEQUENCES AND SOME NICER FORMS
Below we give some consequences and equivalents assuming ZFC holds in
V.
Theorem 8. IFS(L(R)) ⊢ CH
proof Every bijection between a countable ordinal and a subset of R
is an element of L(R) and ω1 = ω
L(R)
1 . So if P = the set of bijections
from countable ordinals into R then P is a definable element of L(R).
Since P is σ closed, a P generic over V will not add any reals, so
by IFS(L(R)) there is a G ⊆ P which is L(R) generic. If α is an
ordinal less than ω1 and r is a real, let Dα = {p ∈ P | α ∈ domp} and
Dr = {p ∈ P | r ∈ ran p}. For each α < ω1, G ∩ Dα 6= ∅ and for each
r ∈ R, G ∩Dr 6= ∅, so
⋃
G is a bijection from ω1 to R.
Theorem 9. IFS(L(R)) iff every P definable in L(R) such that r.o.(P )
is (ω, ω) distributive has an L(R) generic subset.
proof By Theorem 1.
Theorem 10. IFS(∀L(Vα)) iff every α ∈ Ord and P definable in
L(Vω+α) such that r.o.(P ) is (ℵβ,ℵβ) distributive for each β < α, has
an L(Vα) generic subset.
proof By Theorem 1.
Theorem 11. IFS(L) ↔ every set definable in L is countable.
proof Certainly if every set definable in L is countable, then if P is a
partial order definable in L then so is D the set of dense subsets of P in
L, so D is countable and therefore P has a generic subset over L in the
universe. In the other direction, if s is a set definable in L, then so is the
partially ordered set consisting of maps from distinct finite subsets of s to
distinct finite subsets of ω, so a L generic subset over the partial ordering
is a witness to |s| = ω.
So CIFS is a natural generalization of IFS(L).
Theorem 12. IFS(L[r]) ↔ for every absolutely definable real r, every
set definable in L[r] is countable.
proof Similar to the previous proof.
Theorem 13. IFS−(∀L(Vα)) → ℵα = ℵ
L(Vω+α)
α ∧ L(Vω+α+1) |= |Vω+α| =
ℵα
proof By induction on α. If α is a limit ordinal then certainly for β < α
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we have by the induction hypothesis,
ℵβ = ℵ
L(Vω+β)
β
which implies ℵα = ℵ
L(Vω+α)
α . By the induction hypothesis we also have
|Vω+α| = ℵα. So in V there is a subset of Vω+α × Vω+α which is a well
ordering of Vω+α of order type ℵα. Since P (Vω+α × Vω+α) ∈ L(Vω+α+1),
L(Vω+α+1) |= |Vω+α| = ℵα
If α = β + 1 then since by the induction hypothesis we have that ℵβ =
ℵ
L(Vω+β)
β and L(Vω+α) |= |Vω+β| = ℵβ, all order types of ordinals less
than ℵα are incoded by subsets of Vω+β ×Vω+β. Since P (Vω+β ×Vω+β) ∈
L(Vω+α), this implies ℵα = ℵ
L(Vω+α)
α . Let P be the partial order of all one
to one maps from initial segments of ℵα into Vω+α. P is ℵβ closed and
P is a definable element of L(Vω+α). By IFS
−(∀L(Vα)), there exists a
G ⊆ P which is L(Vω+α) generic.
⋃
G is a bijection from ℵα onto Vω+α.
Since there is a subset of Vω+α × Vω+α which is a well ordering Vω+α of
order type ℵα and P (Vω+α × Vω+α) ∈ L(Vω+α+1), Vω+α has size ℵα in
L(Vω+α+1).
Corollary 14. IFS−(∀L(Vα)) ⊢ GCH
Theorem 15. IFS(∀L(Vα)) → ℵα = ℵ
L(Vω+α)
α ∧ L(Vω+α+1) |= |Vω+α| =
ℵα
proof Exactly the same as for IFS−(∀L(Vα)).
Corollary 16. IFS(∀L(Vα)) ⊢ IFS
−(∀L(Vα)).
Theorem 17. IFS−(∀L(Vα)) implies that for every regular cardinal ℵα,
L(Vω+α+1)− L(Vω+α) 6= ∅
proof Suppose not. Let ℵα be the least regular cardinal such that
L(Vω+α+1) = L(Vω+α)
Note that α is definable in L(Vω+α) either as the least β such that V =
L(Vω+β) or as the least β such that V = L(Vω+β−1). Let P be the set of
bijections between subsets of ℵα+1 of size less than ℵα into subsets of ℵα.
P is a definable element of L(Vω+α+1) and since L(Vω+α+1) = L(Vω+α),
P is a definable element of L(Vω+α). As ℵα is regular, P is < ℵα closed.
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By IFS−(∀L(Vα)), there is a L(Vω+α) generic subset G of P in V.
⋃
G
is a bijection from ℵα+1 to ℵα a contradiction.
Theorem 18. CIFS implies IFS−(∀L(Vα)).
proof Let ℵα be regular and P definable in L(Vω+α) such that P is
ℵβ closed for every β < α. Since P is definable in L(Vω+α) so is the
collection D of dense subsets of P in L(Vω+α) so |D| ≤ ℵα. List D as
{Dζ | ζ < ℵα}. Now by induction on ζ < ℵα, by the < ℵα closedness of
P we can build a sequence 〈pζ | ζ < ℵα〉 such that pζ ∈ Dζ . Let G be
the filter generated by the 〈pζ | ζ < ℵα〉. Now let ℵα be singular and P
definable in L(Vω+α) such that P is ℵβ closed for every β < α. Since
ℵα is singular, P is also ℵα closed. P is definable in L(Vω+α+1) and
so is the set D of dense subsets of P in L(Vω+α+1), so |D| ≤ ℵα+1. As
before we can build an L(Vω+α+1) generic subset of P.
Theorem 19. CIFS → for each regular cardinal ℵα, every set definable
in L(Vω+α) has size a most ℵα in L(Vω+α+1).
proof Let x be definable in L(Vω+α) where ℵα is regular. By theorem
17 α is definable in L(Vω+α). Let γ be the least ordinal greater than ℵα
such that x ∈ Lγ(Vω+α). Since γ is definable in L(Vω+α), γ has size ℵα.
Therefore (Lγ(Vω+α),∈) is isomorphic to a model (Vω+α, E) where E is
a subset of Vω+α×Vω+α. Since the Mostowski Collapsing Theorem holds in
L(Vω+α+1), (Vα+ω, E) is isomorphic to (L(Vω+α),∈) in L(Vω+α+1) and
therefore x can have size at most |Vω+α| = ℵα in L(Vω+α+1).
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Picture of the Universe under ZFC + CIFS
Under CIFS, for every regular cardinal ℵα, all definable elements of
L(Vω+α) have size at most ℵα in L(Vω+α+1), forcing L(Vω+α+1)−L(Vω+α)
large.
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SOME PARTING PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS
The conventional view of the history of set theory says that Godel in
1938 proved that the consistency of ZF implies the consistency of ZFC
and of ZFC +GCH, and that Cohen with the invention of forcing proved
that Con(ZF ) implies Con(ZF + ¬AC) and Con(ZFC + ¬GCH), but
if IFS(L) is correct, a better way to state the history would be to say
that Godel discovered L and Cohen discovered that there are many generic
extensions of L.
The author believes that not all transitive models of ZFC are created
equal and that set theorists should make more active use of this fact, while
they should place less emphasis on relative consistency results. Some For-
malists may object to the Platonistic slant of this exposition, but a Formalist
can always play the game of pretending to be a Platonist. Finally, the author
thinks it is ironic that although mathematics and especially mathematical
logic is an art noted for its precise and formalized reasoning, it seems that
in order to solve problems at the frontiers of logic’s foundations we must
tackle questions of an esthetic nature of the kind addressed in this article.
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